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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 11 or the Rule) is
perhaps one of the. most controversial and debated rules among judges,
attorneys and academics today. Rule 11 is intended to prevent frivolous
litigation by allowing courts to impose sanctions upon an attorney or pro se'
party who files a case in bad faith, without substantial justification, or
without reasonable investigation. 2 The current version of Rule 11, enacted
in 1993, provides an objective standard to determine whether or not an
attorney has filed a groundless pleading.
Originally, Rule 11 imposed merely a subjective "good faith" standard
on attorney's pleadings. Change came as the result of a substantial increase
in frivolous lawsuits. The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 replaced the lenient
subjective standard, embodied in the original 1938 version of Rule 11, with a
stricter objective standard. 3 Under the objective standard, attorneys no
longer have an excuse to avoid the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable
inquiry. In addition to this new standard, the 1983 Rule provided for
mandatory sanctions. The Rule also allowed compensation for the attorney's
fees incurred by the injured party.
Rule 11 took another step when the 1993 amendment imposed a
continuing duty on an attorney to correct or withdraw a pleading or motion
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1. A pro se party is a party that represents himself or herself without the assistance of
counsel.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

3. The most recent amendments to Rule 11, which took effect on December 1, 1993,
include a new, non-mandatory sanctioning power and a twenty-one day "safe harbor" period,
during which time the movant may withdraw his or her motion or other paper without a penalty.
FED. R. Civ. P. II(c)(I)(A).
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after it is signed if the documents appear to have become frivolous in light of
new facts or law. The present form of Rule 11 places an affirmative duty on
counsel throughout the proceedings to make a reasonable inquiry into the
facts constituting the basis for a claim. 4 If an attorney or pro se party fails
to investigate the facts giving rise to the pleading, and the court later finds
the pleading to be groundless, the attorney or pro se party may be sanctioned
under Rule 11. The 1993 version uses the same objective standard as the
1983 version. However, in the 1993 revision, sanctions became discretionary
with the court, rather than mandatory. The current Rule 11 also created a
twenty-one day "safe harbor" during which a party may withdraw the
pleading without penalty.
Currently, a bill is before Congress which, if passed, would substantially
alter the provisions of Rule 11 by reinstating some of the aspects of the 1983
Rule, and also by taking a further step. The House of Representatives passed
section 104(B) of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act (CSLRA) on March
7, 1995, as section 4 of the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995 (AAA).'
This new bill may be a response to criticism that the 1993 version left Rule
11 with little power. 6 Specifically, AAA would make the imposition of
sanctions for violation of Rule 11 mandatory, rather than discretionary,7 thus
"put[ting] a bigger emphasis on the Rule's compensatory function by
clarifying that sanctions should be sufficient to deter repetition and to
compensate the parties that were injured."'
Further, AAA provides
mandatory compensation for attorney's fees as a part of the sanction.9 In
addition, it would eliminate the "safe harbor" provision of the current Rule
11(c), which allows an attorney or litigant twenty-one days to withdraw

4. Rule 11 has gone full circle in how the judges should treat violations of the Rule: the
1938 Rule employed a subjective standard; the 1983 Rule employed an objective standard with
mandatory sanctions; and the 1993 Rule employed an objective standard with discretionary
sanctions and a twenty-one day "safe harbor" provision. The more lenient subjective standard
employed by the 1938 Rule allowed an attorney or pro se party to file a pleading if the attorney
or pro se party believed that the pleading was not frivolous. Today, if the court finds the
pleading to be frivolous, the court may impose sanctions at its discretion. Thus, violations of the
1993 Rule do not automatically trigger sanctions; rather, sanctions are left to the discretion of the
trial court. Jeffrey A. Parness, The New FederalRule 11: Different Sanctions, Second Thoughts,
83 ILL. B.J. 126, 126-27 (1995).
5. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995). See also Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other
Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699, 721-22 (1995).
6. SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., reprinted in AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507-10 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
[hereinafter SUPREME COURT].
7. In essence, this new bill would return Rule 11 back to the 1983 version. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 167-68 (1983).
8. H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 18 (1995).
9. Id.
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challenged pleadings without penalty or sanction."0 Finally, AAA would
require application of Rule 11 to discovery, thus returning to the 1983
formula. "
Part I of this Article sets forth a brief historical background of the
changes to, and application of, the Rule 11 sanctions. 2 Part II will discuss
and analyze the 1991 and 1995 published surveys.' 3 In Part III, the 1996
data collected from bar associations and federal courts by the authors will be
reviewed and analyzed. Included in the data are the opinions of the bench
and bar relating to non-mandatory sanctions and the "safe harbor" provisions
contained in the present rule. The authors will also discuss whether the
federal district courts are usurping the function of the bar association and
disciplinary processes when no local court rules refer substantial Rule 11
violations to these bodies.
This Article will conclude by proposing a
modification of the current Rule I1 and the proposed Rule 11, which reflects
a compromise between the 1993 Rule and the 1995 version of the Rule. The
proposal calls for the elimination of the "safe harbor" provision but the
retention of the judge's discretion regarding non-mandatory sanctions. The
policy behind this proposal is that the "safe harbor" allows attorneys to file
frivolous lawsuits with impunity. While frivolous claims may not be filed on
a large scale, these claims give the appearance of attorney impropriety. This
appearance of impropriety can be more detrimental to the profession than any
actual impropriety.
I.

A.

FEDERAL RULE 11

The Original Rule 11 as Enacted in 1938

The Supreme Court created Rule 11 in 1938 to prevent potential abuse
of the legal process.' 4
This original Rule 11 required attorneys to

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 14-84 and accompanying text.
13. ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES (1991) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER'S DIRECTIONS-SPECIAL ISSUE ON RULE 11 (1991) [hereinafter FJC's DIRECTIONS];
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938). The 1938 version of Rule 11 provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that averments
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"certify" 15 that: (1) their pleadings were well-grounded in fact and law; and
(2) their pleadings were not filed for the purpose of delaying any
proceeding.' 6
By requiring certification, Rule 11 aimed to discourage
attorneys from deliberately including false claims in their pleadings. 7 The
original Rule applied only to pleadings and allowed courts to strike any
pleadings that were not filed in good faith.

8

The original Rule also gave federal courts the discretion to impose
sanctions against attorneys for "willful violations" of the Rule. 9 However,

of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of
one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of
an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of the rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Id., reprinted in 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1331 (2d ed. 1990). Rule It serves to remind attorneys of their continuing
obligation to the legal system as well as to the interests of justice. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 260 (2d ed. 1993). For a history of the original rule, see D. Michael
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976). Risinger notes that American courts have
historically asserted inherent power to discipline members of the legal profession. Id. at 44.
This inherent power encompasses the power to require an attorney to make compensatory
payments to those aggrieved by the attorney's misconduct. Additionally, the 1993 Advisory
Committee Notes state that "[t]he court has available a variety of possible sanctions .... [Rule
11] does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in deciding whether to
impose a sanction or what sanctions would be appropriate. . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory
committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 587 (1993). See also Stephen R. Ripps, Ohio
Civil Rule 11: Time for Change, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 134-45 (1994).
15. Prior to 1983, Rule 11 required the signature of an attorney of any pleading filed with
the court. This signature was deemed to be a "certification" that the attorney had read the
pleading and that the pleading was well-grounded in fact. See Risinger, supra note 14, at 8.
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938), reprinted in WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, §
1331.
17. See American Auto. Ass'n v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938).
For example, in Brown v. District Unemployment
Compensation Bd., the court struck down an obviously false pleading. 411 F. Supp. 1001
(D.D.C. 1975). Generally, courts were reluctant to strike a pleading that contained any valid
claim or defense. The courts recognized that to do so would punish the party too severely when
the false pleading was truly the fault of the attorney. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 14, at
261. Professor Risinger concluded that the statutory language was not carefully drafted. See
Risinger, supra note 14, at 33-34. Pleadings that were actually "signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of the rule" would be labeled merely "false" and stricken solely for that reason. Id.
19. Risinger, supra note 14, at 33-34; see also Susan Lawshe, Rule 11, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 71, 74 (1989) (explaining that the original Rule 11 did not require courts to impose
sanctions for noncompliance with the Rule).
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courts could not impose sanctions against a party if the party was represented
by an attorney. 2" The Rule had little effect in preventing any abuse of
litigation, as judges experienced difficulty in defining the subjective type of
behavior that warranted sanctions.2 Thus, courts rarely invoked the Rule
prior to its amendment in 1983.22 The Rule's lack of guidance about the
types of sanctions that courts could impose, as well as its failure to define the
type of behavior that warranted sanctions, contributed to the non-use of the
Rule.23 Also, Rule lI 's minimal standards and the heavy burden to prove
violations contributed to the Rule's failure to deter abuses of the litigation
process. 24 The Federal Rules Advisory Committee amended Rule 11 in
1983 to address the Rule's weaknesses.'
B. The 1983 Amendment to Rule 11
Federal courts have always had the authority to sanction frivolous
pleadings and papers.26
Historically, judicial, statutory, and procedural
guidelines were vague, which made sanctions rare. 27
The increase in

20. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
In addition, Professor Risinger based his position,
regarding Rule 13, upon "the historical and functional relationship between summary judgment
and the motion to strike as sham." Risinger, supra note 14, at 29-30; see also D. Michael
Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment in the Supreme Court's
New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (1988). In his Counter-Revolution
article, Professor Risinger argues for a new summary judgment rule, one that "places the burden
of production and persuasion on the claim that the trial record can be confidently predicted
pretrial squarely on the movant, whether plaintiff or defendant." Id. at 43. Professor Risinger
maintains that the burden of the 1993 changes to the federal rules, including Rule 11, falls more
heavily on plaintiffs than on defendants. Id. at 35.
21. 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1334. For a more thorough discussion on
litigation abuse, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION
ABUSE (2d ed. 1994).
22. Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270 (1989). As of 1989, there were approximately 1000 reported opinions
involving Rule 11 sanctions. Id. For a discussion on the effects of the 1983 amendments to
Rule 11, see Cary Coglianese, Note, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 344, 344
n.2 (1983) (citing William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013
n.2 (1988) (counting the number of reported decisions as of 1987)).
23. See Lawshe, supra note 19, at 74.
24. Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 (1986).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983). The committee determined that "Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring
abuses." Id.; see also Lawshe, supra note 19, at 74 (explaining that Federal Rules Advisory
Committee sought to reduce courts' limitation on the implementation of the Rule which was
"provid[ing] a forum for abusive tactics and [for] increas[ing] the cost and complexity of
litigation").
26. H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 9 (1995).
27. Id.
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frivolous litigation, discovery abuses, and unfair litigation practices provoked
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.28
The drafters designed these
amendments to further promote the original purpose of Rule 11 by providing
changes to deter perceived abuses. 29 The introduction of a new standard for
determining whether an attorney could be sanctioned constituted one of the
Rule's most significant changes.
Prior to the 1983 amendment, Rule 11 required an attorney to certify
that he or she had read the pleading and that, to the best of his or her
knowledge, the pleading was well-grounded and "not interposed for
delay."' Thus, an attorney was held to a Subjective standard of good faith

28. Lawshe, supra note 19, at 74. At the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, then Chief Justice Burger was alarmed
by the "widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are overly tolerant to lawyers
who exploit the inherently contentious aspects of the adversary system to their own private
advantage at public expense." H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 19 (1995). The 1983 amendments
addressed these problems. Specifically, the requirement that an attorney sign (certify) each
pleading was substantially altered, emphasizing the importance of certification and allowing the
courts to enforce any violation of the Rule. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 261.
Congress had three purposes in promulgating the 1983 version of Rule 11: restrict litigation
abuse, hold attorneys responsible for their actions, and curb the increasing federal case load.
The Advisory Committee noted that former Rule 11 was ineffective by providing mandatory
sanctions that would prohibit courts from minimizing violations, thereby the deterrent effect.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); see also Adam H. Bloomenstein, Developing Standardsfor the Imposition of Sanctions
Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 AKRON L. REV. 289 (1988); Robert
L. Carter, The History And Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4 (1985); Victor H.
Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV.
793, 193-96 (1991) (asserting that courts have applied Rule 11 inconsistently); Lawshe, supra
note 19, at 74-75 (citing reasons for 1983 amendments to Rule 11); Thomas F. Maffei, Rule
11-The Wrong Approach to Professionalism in Civil Litigation, 73 MASS. L. REV. 98 (1988);
Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some 'Chilling' Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation And Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986) (discussing the 1983
amendments and their effects).
29. In drafting the amendments to Rule 11, the Advisory Committee stressed the deterrent
purpose of the sanctions: "[I]mposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage the
dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous
claims or defenses." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision) advisory committee's note, reprinted in
97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983); see also Yagman v. Baden, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986)
(noting that primary purpose of sanctions is to deter subsequent abuses), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 111 F.R.D. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd
in part and vacated and remanded in part, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that under
Rule 11 court was not obligated to grant full amount of attorneys' fees since Rule 11 award was
primarily intended to impose deterrent sanction against conduct of counsel rather than
compensate "injured" party for out-of-pocket expenses), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1081 (1994).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983 revision) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983). In comparison, the 1938 Rule required only certification as to "good ground."
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because the Rule did not impose a duty to investigate the factual basis
underlying the claim." Due to the difficulty of determining whether or not
an attorney acted in good faith, the 1983 amendment dropped the subjective
good faith standard and replaced it with an objective standard that required
the attorney32 to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis for every
type of pleading. 33 Thus, the 1983 amendments were intended to make the
certification requirement "more stringent" with the expectation "that a greater
range of circumstances will trigger" violations of the signature rule.'
The
1983 amendment also mandated that the court impose sanctions on either the
party or his or her lawyer. Sanctions were imposed if, at the time of filing,
a reasonable inquiry would have revealed that the pleading was not well-

31. Id.
32. The 1983 adiendment expanded Rule 11 to apply to pro se parties as well as to
attorneys. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 165.
33. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note explains that the standard for determining a
reasonable inquiry is one of "reasonableness under the circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 11
(1983 revision) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 198.
The Rule, as amended in 1983, provided:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68.
The 1983 Rule effected many changes. First, the Rule provided a definite standard
requiring reasonable prefiling inquiry as to facts and law. Second, the 1983 Rule applied to all
persons appearing pro se as well as to attorneys and parties. Third, the Rule provided that the
pleadings had to be "well grounded" in fact and warranted by existing law. Fourth, papers filed
could not be used for improper purposes, such as harassment. Furthermore, the court was
required to impose a sanction on an attorney or party who violated the Rule. Finally, the
sanction imposed was an "appropriate sanction," which included reasonable expenses and
attorneys' fees.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 198-99.
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grounded in fact, or if the pleading party lacked a good faith argument for
Rule 11 allowed a court to exercise
the modification of existing law.3'
discretion in determining which sanction would be imposed for a Rule 11
violation.' If a court found a Rule I1 violation, that party, under the 1983
Rule, could have been held responsible for his opponent's expenses and legal
fees.3"
In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,38 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the manner in which an attorney or pro se
party could fulfill his or her duty to make a reasonable inquiry. Golden
Eagle involved an appeal from sanctions imposed under an unsuccessful
motion for summary judgment in which the appellant argued that one state's39
statute of limitations applied over another state's statute of limitations.
The appellant implied to the district court that existing law supported
appellant's position when, in fact, appellant's motion for summary judgment,
if successful, would have modified or reversed existing law.'
The district
court also sanctioned the appellant for failure to cite contrary authority which
violated the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.4 '

35. Id. The courts have since provided some indication of the level of investigation
necessary for an attorney to meet this standard. See Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d
658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 1987); Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1012-14 (2d
Cir. 1986); see also Lawshe, supra note 19, at 74.
36. Lawshe, supra note 19, at 75. The additional language provides that "[i]f a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose . . . an appropriate sanction." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision),
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167. Sanctions could be imposed on the person who signed, whether
the signer was the attorney or the client. Id. For an empirical analysis of Rule 11, see Gerald
F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical, Comparative Study, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1992); Lawrence C. Marshall et al., Public Policy: The Use and Impact of
Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943 (1992).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 167-68.
38. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 1533-34. Though the district court acknowledged that appellant's positions were
legally and factually supportable, it nevertheless imposed sanctions. Id. at 1534. Because the
appellant had implied that appellant's position was "warranted by existing law," rather than
stating that its position was "grounded in good faith argument for the extension, modification or
reversal of existing law," the district court determined that sanctions were warranted. The
district court held that the moving papers filed by appellant failed to cite contrary authority and,
therefore, violated Rule 3.3 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1983), thus breaching Rule 11. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1535-36 (referring to Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1, 4.4 (1983)); see
also American Bar Association & The Bureau of National Affairs, Practice Guide on Rule 11
(1992).
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The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court improperly imposed
sanctions. 42
The appellate court reversed the district court's broad
application of Rule 11, holding that the appellant did not have to identify
whether or not appellant's position was supported by existing law. 43 The
Ninth Circuit stated that neither the history of the Rule nor the Rule itself
supported the type of identification argument made by the district court."
The Ninth Circuit further held that the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
for the failure to cite adverse authority imposed a burden that went beyond
the scope of the Rule.45 The extension of Rule 11 would force attorneys or
pro se parties to exhaust every possible theory on an issue before filing
suit.'
The extension would also force courts to conduct research to ensure
that attorneys or pro se parties did not overlook any applicable case law.4
In one respect, Golden Eagle extended the Rule 11 power of courts.
The Ninth Circuit approved the use of Rule 11 sanctions to punish a party
responsible for filing a frivolous pleading. The court concluded that Rule 11
authorized the courts to sanction both the attorneys and the party that the
attorneys represented if both the attorney and the party were responsible for
48
the unfounded lawsuit.
In Albright v. Upjohn, 4 the Sixth Circuit also
addressed an attorney's

duty to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of a motion or a
42. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1534.
43. Id. at 1539-40.
44. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1539-41 (9th Cir.
1986).
45. Id. at 1542. The court stated that "Rule I1 should not impose the risk of sanctions in
the event that the court later decides that the lawyer was wrong. The burdens of 'research and
briefing by a diligent lawyer anxious to avoid any possible rebuke would be great." Id.
46. Id. Such an extension would also impose an undue burden upon a court to determine if
the attorneys did, in fact, conduct exhaustive investigations.
47. Id. In Golden Eagle, the district court charged the appellant with constructive notice
because the cited authorities were listed in Shepard's as "distinguishing" the case upon which the
appellant relied. The appeals court noted that the district court's implementation of Rule 11
would increase litigation by creating "two ladders for after-the-fact review of asserted unethical
conduct: one consisting of sanction procedures, the other consisting of the well established bar
and court ethical procedures." Id. The decision emphasized that a court is not powerless with
respect to sanctioning lawyers who take positions that are not supported by law. The appeals
court noted that "Rule 11 is not the only tool available to judges in imposing sanctions on
lawyers." Id.
48. Id. at 1536. This extension by the federal courts supports this author's recommendation
that Ohio courts follow the legislative interpretation rather than the common-law interpretation.
49. 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 3

76

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

pleading.'
Albright sued Upjohn for manufacturing the drug that caused
her injuries. 5 Some of Albright's medical records were incomplete while
others were illegible.52 Accordingly, uncertainty existed concerning whether
Upjohn manufactured the drug that injured Albright.53 Albright based her
lawsuit on the fact that Upjohn had been a defendant in similar suits,5"
Albright then relied upon discovery to determine if her claim had merit. The
Sixth Circuit sanctioned Albright under Rule 11 because she asserted a claim
against Upjohn before she knew whether the claim had any basis in fact.55
Under amended Rule 11, Albright had a duty to make a reasonable inquiry
into the facts before filing a pleading or motion. 56 When Albright did not
comply with this duty, Rule 11 demanded that the court impose sanctions
57
against her.
In addition to exploring the factual basis for a claim, the duty to make a
reasonable inquiry under Rule 11 also extends to the legal basis of a claim.

50. Id. The "objective unreasonableness" defined in Albright has been uniformly adopted as
the standard under Rule 11 as amended in 1983. See Lemaster v. United States, 891 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1989); Hudson v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1987); Eavenson,
Auchumty & Greenwals v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
Servs., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
51. Albright, 788 F.2d at 1218-19.
Albright alleged that, as an infant, she ingested
tetracycline-based drugs that were manufactured, distributed, publicized and sold by Upjohn and
possible unknown defendants who could have been in the same business at the time and that
these drugs caused the discoloration of her teeth.
52. Id. at 1220-21. In response to Upjohn's contention that Albright failed to conduct a
reasonable pre-filing investigation, Albright asserted that her medical records were old and
illegible, that the records of her deceased doctor were lost, and that she was continuously
searching for their medical records. Albright asserted that these factors, in addition to the fact
that Upjohn was named as a leading defendant in such actions, demonstrated her reasonable
inquiry into the factual basis of her claims.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1219. Albright first discovered the connection between the drugs and her injuries
on September 22, 1982, when she read an article about another lawsuit filed against tetracycline
manufacturers.
55. Albright v. Upjohn, 788 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1986). The court stated that
Albright's pre-filing investigation was insufficient to satisfy Rule 11 as "it failed to disclose that
the claim against Upjohn was 'well grounded in fact' within the meaning of Rule 11 or that there
existed any likelihood that additional medical records would be located that could not have been
found through reasonable inquiry prior to filing." Id.
56. id. ("The new language stresses the need for some pre-filing inquiry into both the facts
and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of
reasonableness under the circumstances.") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983 revision) advisory
committee's note).
57. Albright, 788 F.2d at 1222 (stating that the language of Rule 11 clearly mandates the
imposition of sanctions once a violation is found).
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The Second Circuit, in Eastway Construction Corp. v. New York,58 held that
an attorney has a duty to make a reasonable inquiry into whether existing law
supports a pleading or whether a legitimate argument exists to warrant
modification of existing law.59
In that case, the petitioner raised two
claims in federal court. One claim involved an antitrust violation, and the
other claim involved a civil rights violation.'
The federal district court
dismissed both claims because the claims lacked merit. 6' The court also
imposed sanctions on Eastway's attorneys, stating that the attorneys would
have known that no legal basis supported the allegations had the attorneys
conducted a reasonable inquiry.'
The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 dramatically increased the number of
sanctions that courts could impose against attorneys. 63 The cases above
provide examples of how the federal courts have been able to use the
objective standard to impose sanctions on attorneys and parties for
irresponsible conduct. Replacing the subjective standard with the objective
standard in Rule 11 has proven effective in guiding the imposition of
sanctions for the filing of frivolous pleadings in federal court.'

58. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987) (involving construction company that was denied entry into
redevelopment programs taking place in New York City and sought relief in federal court).
59. 762 F.2d at 253.
60. Id. at 248. Eastway was in the business of constructing publicly financed housing
projects in New York City. Id. at 246. During the early 1970's, the City's loan program was
under scrutiny for illegal operations. Id. Eastway's president was heavily involved in the
scandal and had defaulted on city loans. Id.
61. Id. The court dismissed the civil rights claim because Eastway did not allege a
deprivation of any federally protected right. Id. at 249. The court dismissed the antitrust claim
because no injury to competition existed. Id. at 251. The court stated that if Eastway's antitrust
claim were allowed to proceed, "every joint decision to hire one contractor over another . . .
would be assailable under the Sherman Act," and that such a result would be contrary to the
Act's intention. Id.
62. Id. at 251-54. The court refrained from saying that Eastway or its attorneys acted in
bad faith. Id. at 254. The court stated, however, that any "competent attorney," upon
reasonable inquiry, would have realized the claims were "destined to fail." Id.
63. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988) (noting
the increase in federal sanction litigation and resulting effects).
64. Recently, a New Jersey court sanctioned an attorney who initiated a frivolous lawsuit.
The court awarded the defendant attorneys' fees and reasonable costs totaling $75,000 for having
to defend the lawsuit. Hamilton v. Parcells, L-30327-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (unreported).
The Hamilton case involved the New York Giants and former player Hamilton. Hamilton
alleged that the head coach had promised him a coaching position and then reneged on the basis
of Hamiltion's race. The plaintiffs lawyer introduced a tape at trial that showed only that
Hamilton had been promised a position as a coach. The court found that the plaintiff and his
attorney violated federal Rule 11 as well as New Jersey's frivolous claims statute. Another
award of sanctions includes Marianiv. Doctors Assocs., 983 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding
award of $7500 imposed against counsel for failure to conduct reasonable inquiry). A single
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C. The 1993 Amendment to Rule 11
Despite its effectiveness in guiding sanctions, Rule 11 was amended in
1993 to include a twenty-one day period of "safe harbor" during which time
a party, that has filed a motion or other paper in court, may withdraw that
motion or paper and escape sanctions under Rule 11. The new Rule also
does not include the former mandatory sanction provision. If a violation is
found, the judge retains the discretion to determine whether sanctions should
be imposed.
Also, "all discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions subject to the provisions of Rule 26 through 37" were removed from
the scope of Rule 11. 1
The criticism of the 1983 amendment centered around the belief that the
Rule discriminated against certain lawyers or parties and that the sanctioning
procedures were deficient.'
Further, the 1983 version of Rule 11 resulted
in satellite litigation,67 the cost of which exceeded the benefits.'
The
Committee on Federal Courts found, among other reasons, that the 1983
version of Rule 11 placed too heavy of a burden on plaintiffs, lacked
uniformity in its application, restricted judicial discretion, and furthered the

use of "shifting" counsel fees rather than imposing other sanctions.'

While

the 1993 amendment altered the manner in which a court applied the Rule,

violation of the Rule could result in a sanction ordering payment of hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(sanctions imposed on counsel for failure to conduct reasonable inquiry); Levy v. Aaron Faber,
Inc. 148 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (failure to conduct reasonable inquiry). See, e.g.,
Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ($1,034,381.36 in sanctions), af'd,
932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992); see also Brandt v. Schal
Assocs., 960 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding $351,664.96 sanctions imposed by court
for filing unsupported RICO action); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 945 (II1. App.
Ct. 1984) (awarding Rule 11 sanction of $1.8 million for filing frivolous lawsuit).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(d). See also 146 F.R.D. 584. Inapplicability to Discovery Rules
26-37, governing the discovery process, control the circumstances when sanctions may be
imposed for inappropriate behavior to discovery. For that reason, Rule 11 (d) provides that Rule
11(a), (b), and (c) have no applicability to discovery issues. See, e.g., BAICKER-MCKEE,
JANSEN & CORR, A STUDENTS GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 172
(1997); 146 F.R.D. 584.
66. Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The New Monetary
Sanctionsfor the "Stop-And-Think-Again" Rule, 1993 BYU L. REV. 879, 883 (1993).
67. Satellite litigation is sanctions-related litigation in the courts outside the merits of the
original case. WIGGINS ET AL., DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 6.
68. Id.
69. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Related Rules, in 46 RECORD OF THE
Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 267 (1991). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
adopted the amended Rule, and the Rule took effect December 1, 1993. 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993).
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these changes did not alter the Rule's purpose of preventing litigation
abuses.'
The Advisory Committee stated that "this revision is intended to
remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the
1983 revision of the rule." 71 Concern also existed that plaintiffs were

70. The substantive provisions of Rule 11 now provide:
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the
violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to
violate subdivision (b) [representation to the court certifying that attorney conducted
reasonable inquiry under the circumstances]. It shall be served as provided in Rule
5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after
service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn
or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or
opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held
jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and
employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b)
with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of the Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitation in subparagraphs (A)
and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a non-monetary nature,
an order to pay a penalty into court, or if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant for some or all of the
reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred as a result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b) (2). (B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the
court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned. (3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall
describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the
basis for the sanction imposed. (d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a)
through (c) of this rule do not apply to disclosure and discovery requests, responses,
objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprintedin 146 F.R.D. 583 (1993).
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discouraged by the 1983 Rule 11 from freely raising novel issues out of fear
that the court would impose sanctions.' In addition, the Committee opined
that "sometimes a litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is true
or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties
or third persons to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the
allegation."'3
D. The Proposed 1995 Amendment to Rule 11

On April 23, 1993, the United States Supreme Court adopted revisions
of Rule 11, which took effect on December 1, 1993.' 4
Upon the
promulgation of the 1993 version, Justice Scalia anticipated that the revision
would eliminate a "significant and necessary deterrent" to frivolous
litigation.75 In his dissenting opinion to the 1993 amendments, Justice
Scalia said,

72. Risinger, supra note 14, at 56. Rule 1 sanctions were frequently imposed on plaintiffs
lawyers. David Frum, Shoot the Hostages, FORBES, Dec. 21, 1992, at 138 (commenting that "if
the Supreme Court rubber-stamps the new, weaker version of Rule 11, it will only be adding to
the country's litigation overload").
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993). The Committee qualifies this
statement with the following reminder:
Tolerance of factual contentions in initial pleadings by plaintiffs or defendants
when specifically identified as made on information and belief does not relieve
litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into the facts...
[I]t is not a license to join parties, make claims, or present defenses without any
factual basis or justification.
FED R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note (1993). "To stress the seriousness of a motion
for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the rule, the revision provides
that the 'safe harbor' period begins to run only upon service of the motion." Id.
74. SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 401. Justice Scalia dissented from the Supreme
Court's adoption of the rules, stating that the much feared Rule 11 has been rendered "toothless
by allowing judges to dispense with sanction, by disfavoring compensation for litigation
expenses, and by providing a 21-day 'safe harbor'." Id. at 507-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Further, Justice Scalia did not believe that Rule 11, as it was amended in 1983, was ineffective.
Id. at 509.
The authors agree with Justice Scalia's proposition that the 1983 version of Rule 11 was
not proving to be ineffective. To the contrary, Rule 11 has successfully deterred litigation
abuses. For example, Rule 11 has led to Rule 11 committees within firms, the purpose of which
is to ensure that a claim does not violate the Rule. See BRIAN J. REDDING, ATTORNEY'S
LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., SANCTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AND SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT PREVENTION 4 (1992). The authors are of the opinion that the
"safe harbor" provision may encourage attorneys to file lawsuits without penalty and impunity.
However, the Advisory Committee noted that, if deterrence is ineffective, the court could also
require the wrongdoer to make a payment to the injured party. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's notes (1993).
75. H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 10 (1995).
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[Tihe proposed revision would render the Rule toothless, by
allowing judges to dispense with sanctions. by disfavoring
compensation for litigation expenses, and by providing a twenty-one
day 'Safe Harbor' within which, if the party accused of a frivolous
filing withdraws the filing, he is entitled to escape with no sanction
at all. 76
In fact, Justice Scalia stated that "Uludges, like other human beings, do
not like imposing punishment when their duty does not require it, especially
on their own acquaintances and members of their own profession.""
Indeed, Justice Scalia's beliefs regarding the 1993 amendments may have
been correct. One year after the 1993 amendments went into effect, research
78
showed that thirty-eight percent fewer Rule 11 motions were filed.
Currently pending in Congress is H.R. 988 which contains revisions of
Rule 11 in five main areas.79 First, and most importantly, H.R. 988 makes
judicial imposition of sanctions for violations of Rule 11 mandatory rather
Second, attorney's fees are a mandatory part of the
than discretionary.'
8
sanction. ' Third, the proposed Rule broadens the scope of the Rule's
compensatory function.8 Emphasis is put not only on deterring repetition
Fourth, H.R. 988
of violations, but also on compensating injured parties.'
would eliminate the "safe harbor" provision.'M Fifth, the proposed changes
would again make Rule 11 applicable to discovery abuses." These changes
are intended to "send a clear message that abusive practices will not be
tolerated by our judicial system or the judges who form its core." I
Rule 11 has been influential in litigation practices, while at the same
With the proposed 1995
time being heavily debated over the years.
amendment, it appears history is repeating itself. However, the published

76. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PORCEDURE AND FORMS, reprinted in

146 F.R.D. 401, 510 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 508.
78. Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining: Decrease Attributed to 1-Year-Old SafeHarbor Amendments to Rule 11, A.B.A. J., March 1995, at 12.
79. This bill was passed by the House of Representatives on March 7, 1995. However, the
Senate never addressed the bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 13-15 (1995).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 14 (1995).
86. Id.at 11.
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1991 and 1995 surveys and the research performed in preparation of this
Article show that both bench and bar are satisfied with the 1993 version of
Rule 11.
II.
A.

PUBLISHED SURVEYS

The 1991 Survey

In response to the 1983 version of Rule 11, the Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules reviewed the Rule in 1990.'7 The
Committee called for comments from the legal community and asked the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to do an empirical study of the operation and
impact of the Rule."8
The judges' responses recorded two themes. First, most judges believed
that the benefits of Rule 11 outweighed any additional requirements on
judges' time. 89 Further, the judges believed that Rule 11 had an overall
positive effect on litigation in the federal courts.' Specifically, when asked
what the judges believed to be the overall effect of the Rule, 80% responded
that it had been positive and favored retaining it in its 1983 form, and 72%
thought the benefits of the Rule outweighed the outlay of judicial time
required to implement it. 9'
Second, while judges reported that groundless litigation represented only
a small problem on their dockets,' they believed that Rule 11 had been
Twenty percent of
moderately effective in deterring groundless papers.'
the judges believed that there was a moderate problem, while 75 % said there

87. WIGGINS ET AL., FJC's DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 1.

88. Id. Specifically, questionnaires were sent in November, 1990, to all active and senior
United States district court judges. Of the 751 judges to whom the questionnaire was sent, 583
(78%) responded. Id.at 2.
89. WIGGINS ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
90. Id. This survey was done in consideration of the amendments to the 1983 Rule. After
the conclusion of this survey, the 1993 amendments were later approved and incorporated.
91. Id.
92. Specifically, Rule 11 motions could be expected to be raised in two to three percent of
all cases. Id.; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11,
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 3. Some critics argue that Rule 11
results in burdensome satellite litigation. However, based on these numbers, it is apparent that
Rule 11 motions are not a significant burden.
93. WIGGINS ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. Further, the survey showed that
judges found several other methods more effective than Rule 11 in handling such litigation. Id.
Specifically, judges found very effective prompt rulings on motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, Rule 16 conferences to narrow issues and informal admonitions. Id.at 31.
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was a small problem or no problem at all.'
However, as the FJC noted,
the reasons for variations among judges in their sanctioning practices may be
explained by the varying levels of judicial receptivity to Rule 11. 95
Therefore, these numbers are not determinative and may, in fact, be
inconclusive.
In conclusion, the FJC noted that the data tended to show that the 1983
version of Rule 11 was working as intended, despite minor problems.9
However, in 1993, Congress amended Rule 11.
B. The 1995 Survey
At the request of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the FJC surveyed attorneys and judges
concerning Rule 11 as part of its review of the effects of the 1993
amendments and its consideration of the proposed 1995 changes.'
Specifically, questionnaires were sent to 1130 federal attorneys and 148
federal district judges. 98 Responses were received from 82% of judges and
52% of attorneys.'
While the data showed that there was a general
opposition to the proposed changes,"t o the majority of judges and attorneys
agreed that the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions should encompass compensation
of injured parties as well as deterrence of violations."'
When asked their general views about Rule 11, the vast majority of
respondents agreed that Rule 11 needed some reform, with notable

94. Id. The survey went on to report that few judges believed the Rule 11 violation
problem increased, whereas 40% said it had decreased since Rule 11 was amended in August
1983.
95. WIGGINS Er AL., DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 11.
96. Id at 27. These problems include indeterminacy, disproportionate application of the
Rule to plaintiffs, overuse of monetary sanctions, and lack of procedural safeguards. Id.
97. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id. The surveys sent to judges and attorneys were as similar as possible, but it should
be recognized that judges and attorneys may have different perspectives on Rule 11, not only
because of their different roles in the litigation process, but also because most attorneys work
primarily on similar types of cases whereas judges have experience with different types of cases.
Id.
100. Specifically, the majority of respondents found groundless litigation claims had little
chance and supported the "safe harbor" rule.
101. Id. at 6. Specifically, 68% of judges, 63% of defendants' attorneys, 66% of other
attorneys, and 43% of plaintiffs' attorneys agreed on this issue. The authors agree that
deterrence should be a goal and encourage reporting violations to bar grievance committees as a
preferred method of obtaining the goal.
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differences in how the Rule should be modified. " Responses included
modifying the Rule to increase the Rule's effectiveness in deterring
groundless filings, modifying the Rule to better avoid deterring meritorious
filings, and leaving the Rule in the 1993 version. 3 Regardless of the
form, however, Rule 11 is an integral part of the federal court rules system.
This Article argues that handling substantial Rule 11 violations through bar
grievance committees would further enhance the purpose and important role
of Rule 11.
C. Current Opinions on Rule 11
Any modification of Rule 11 will affect federal judges, bar association
grievance committees, and disciplinary counsel. Because the individuals in
these positions have been involved with disciplinary actions in the past, it is
necessary to consider their experiences with the present Rule 11 and their
views as to how the proposed changes could affect future discipline. Current
disciplinary procedures and concerns with current and proposed reporting
positions should also be considered when pondering changes in Rule 11.
Consequently, Part III of this Article considers these issues.
III. 1996 SURVEY OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
A. Analysis of Data
In order to assess judicial and bar association opinions toward the
present Rule 11 and the proposed Rule 11, the authors mailed 113
questionnaires to federal circuit and district court judges, and thirty-six
questionnaires were returned. An additional sixty-four questionnaires were
mailed to bar associations, with thirty-six questionnaires returned.
All
together, 41% of the questionnaires were returned to the investigators. The
responses were tallied, and the Chi Square test for independence was used to
analyze the responses. The number of responses for the different items
varied as not all respondents answered each question. In addition, several
questions permitted multiple responses.
Finally, several questionnaires
received from both judges and bar associations were not usable and were
excluded from the analysis. Thus, the percentage of the questionnaire that
was determined to be usable for this study and included in this analysis was
36%.

102. Id. at 7.
103. Id.
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Here, in order to facilitate discussion, the analysis of responses is
reported in the order of the questions in the questionnaire. All Chi Square
ratios were tested for significance at the .10 level, and the obtained
probability for each significant analysis is reported. Question 1 was not
tested for significance because of the nature of the question and responses.
Question 1. How Often Do Judges Who Impose Sanctions Report Such
Violations to a Bar Association (BA) or Disciplinary Committee (DC)?
In response, twenty-eight judges estimated that violations were reported
25% of the time or less, and one judge indicated that the percentage was
unknown. Tliirty BA/DC respondents reported that judges did so 25 % of the
time or less, two reported that judges did so between 25% and 50% of the
time, and one indicated that the percentage was unknown.
Question 2. Is There a Local Rule Requirement for the Judges to Report
Such Violations to a BA/DC?
All thirty judges reported there was no local rule, while twenty-five
BA/DC reported there was no rule, and six BA/DC reported that there was a
local rule. A Chi Square of 4.442 was significant at the 0.035 level,
indicating a difference existing between the responses of the judges and those
of the BA/DC, with more BA/DC reporting a local rule than judges. The
reason for this difference is not known and could not be determined from the
questionnaire.
Question 3. Do You Expect All Violations to Be Reported to a BA/DC?
In response to this question, one of the judges and eight of the BA/DC
expected all violations to be reported, while twenty-seven of the judges and
twenty-three of the BA did not expect all violations to be reported. A Chi
Square of 4.038 was significant at the 0.044 level indicating a difference in
the expectations of the judges and BA/DC. While the majority of both
groups did not expect all violations to be reported to a BA/DC, more BA/DC
respondents than judges held such an expectation.
Question 4. What Sanction Is Imposed for Violations?
A tally of the responses obtained for this question is contained in the
following table. The major differences in responses lie in the "none",
"reprimand" and other categories.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 3

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

86

[Vol. 32

None

Reprimand

Compensation

Both

Other

Judges

8

2

3

3

11

BA/DC

2

8

0

0

22

The Chi Square of 16.562 (p < .01) indicated that judges and BA/DC imposed
different kinds of sanctions for violations. Judges were more likely to
impose no sanctions, compensation for expenses, or both compensation and a
reprimand than BA/DC. BA/DC were more likely to impose a reprimand or
The other disciplinary measures reported
other sanctions than judges.
included warnings and suspensions, disbarments and dismissal. Still other
respondents indicated that determinations were made on a case-by-case basis
and were based on items such as the following: the nature and seriousness of
the offense; the attorney's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness; and the
presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Question 5. Do You Favor FRCP 11 Having Mandatory Reporting Positions
Rather than the Current Discretionary Provisions?
Three judges said yes, and twenty-five judges said no. In contrast,
twelve BA/DC responded yes, and nineteen said no. The Chi Square was
significant at the .03 level indicating that, while the majority of both groups
approved of the discretionary provisions, the BA/DC respondents were more
likely to favor mandatory reporting than were judges.
When asked why they were not in
provisions, the responses of the two groups
both groups of respondents appeared to be a
dealing with attorney discipline problems.
below.
Loss of
Discretion

Small
Problem

Judges

16

14

BA/DC

13

3

favor of mandatory reporting
varied. The major concern for
loss of judicial discretion when
The responses are summarized

Deters
Filings

Jeopardy

6

2

0

0

1

3

0

8

No
Problem

Double

Other

j

The Chi Square of 18.1 (p<.01) indicated that the judges were more
likely to view discipline as a small problem or no problem than were the
BA/DC.
Neither group appeared to feel strongly that it would deter
meritorious filings or pose double jeopardy issues. The BA/DC were more
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likely to indicate other issues than judges. Examples of other issues include
the following: court-ordered sanctions make mandatory reporting superfluous;
not all violations should be reported; not all Rule 11 violations involve ethics
or professional conduct; and the same offense may result in multiple
sanctions.
When asked why they were in favor of mandatory reporting provisions,
the responses of the two groups also varied. The judges did not indicate any
one area as a major reason for favoring mandatory reporting, while the
BA/DC respondents indicated that mandatory reporting would strengthen the
Rule and improve the practice of attorneys. Neither group expressed concern
that the "safe harbor" provision weakened deterrence. Responses to this
question are summarized below.
Safe Harbor
Problems

Strengthens
the Rule

Imposes
on All
Violators

Improves
Attorney
Practice

Judges

1

3

0

2

2

0

BA/DC

3

11

1

9

8

3

Improves
Image

Other

The Chi Square of 1.241 indicated that any difference between the
responses of judges and BA/DC was due to chance. The other responses
expressed a need by BA/DC to improve or maintain ethical standards and
identify serial violators.
Question 6. Once a Violation Has Been Reported, What Procedure Is Used
to Process the Violation? Please Briefly Describe the Procedure.
The following summary represents the typical response to this question.
If a violation of Rule 11 were reported, the report would be treated as a
complaint against the attorney in question. A disciplinary file would be
opened, and the attorney would be presented with an opportunity to respond.
Following the response, if there appeared to be a violation of any of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, an investigation would be conducted. The
investigation could result in any action from dismissal of the complaint to the
filing of formal disciplinary charges.
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Question 7. Do You Prefer the Current Discretion of Rule 11 or the
Proposed Mandatory Version?
Twenty-four of the judges and twenty-three of the BA/DC preferred the
current Rule 11, while six of the judges and seven of the BA/DC preferred
the proposed version. The Chi Square of 1.00 was not significant, indicating
no difference in the opinions of the two groups.
Question 8. Would You Be in Favor of a Compromise Change in the "Safe
Harbor" Provision to Fewer Days, such as Seven or Fourteen Days?
Four of the judges and nine of the BA/DC favored a compromise, while
twenty-two of the judges and thirteen of the BA/DC did not. The Chi Square
of 2.745 indicated a slight (p=.098) tendency for the BA/DC to be more
favorable toward a compromise than the judges.
Summary:

Judges reported violations to bar association disciplinary committees a
small percent of the time, and they reported that no local rule required them
to do so. Further, a large majority of the judges and bar associations did not
expect all violations to be reported. The reported behaviors of judges was in
keeping with the expectations of both the judges and bar associations. When
violations of Rule 11 did occur and discipline was imposed, a large range of
sanctions was used, including: reprimand, compensation of the other party,
warnings, suspensions, disbarments and dismissal.
The opinion was
expressed that determinations were and should be made on a case-by-case
basis. Both groups of respondents who were opposed to mandatory reporting
felt that the major problem with mandatory reporting would be the loss of
judicial discretion when dealing with problems. In addition, the judges were
more likely than bar associations to view violations of Rule 11 as a small
problem. While the analysis was not statistically significant, it is interesting
to note that bar associations in favor of mandatory reporting were more likely
to perceive that it would strengthen the Rule and improve attorney practice
and image than judges supporting mandatory reporting. Finally, the large
majority of both judges and bar associations reported that they favored the
current Rule 11 over the proposed Rule 11.
B. Proposal

Thus, this survey disclosed that federal district courts do not have local
rules mandating the reporting of at least substantial Rule 11 violations to the
bar associations or disciplinary counsel.
While the bench favors this
situation, the bar would prefer some type of rule for reporting at least
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substantial Rule 11 violations. Reporting, according to the bar, would deter
the filing of frivolous suits. The reporting would be for substantial, but not
all, violations of Rule 11.
The judges strongly believe in keeping their discretion relating to
reporting substantial Rule 11 violations along with their sanctioning
discretion. The survey also showed that judges were of the opinion that
attorney discipline is a small problem. Neither reporting nor mandatory
sanctioning would deter the filing of frivolous suits. This leads to the opinion
that there may be a need to research law firms with large federal district
court practices and explore the screening of cases and the percentage of filing
cases under the 1983 Rule 11 and their filing practices under the 1993 Rule
11.
To satisfy both sides, this Article proposes that the only amendment to
Rule 11 should be the removal of the "safe harbor" provision. That
provision should be taken out of Rule 11 for several reasons: (1) if it does
not actually reduce frivolous lawsuits, it would at least eliminate the public
perception of attorneys filing frivolous lawsuits with impunity, as long as
they withdraw the case during the twenty-one days; (2) it would screen cases
that should not have been brought, and if brought, the court can exercise its
discretion as to Rule 11 violations, e.g., reporting and sanctioning; and (3)
law firms would more closely screen cases and think harder about filing
lawsuits if the grace period were stricken.
The compromise would accomplish several things. It would maintain the
attitude of both groups that the 1993 legislation is preferred. At the same
time, it would put to rest a public perception of filing frivolous lawsuits
without penalty to the plaintiff. It would allow for better law firm screening
of the cases to be filed. It would create a balance of judges using Rule 11
for the intended procedural purpose and, at the same time, reporting
substantial Rule 11 violations to the appropriate disciplinary body without
usurping the disciplinary function of the bar.
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APPENDIX

EXAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE OF OPINIONS TOWARD FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROPOSALS-RULE 11:
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 11 allows for district court
judges to sanction attorneys who violate its provisions. How often do judges
who impose sanctions report such violations (% of all cases) to a Bar
Association or grievance committee?
0-25%

26-50%

51-75%

76-100%

2. Is there a local rule requirement for the judges to report such violations to
the Bar Association or grievance committee? Yes __
No
_

3. Do you expect all violations to be reported to the Bar Association or
grievance committee? Yes
No
_

4. What sanction is imposed for the violations?
none
reprimand
compensation
both
other, please explain
5.
Do you favor FRCP 11 having mandatory reporting provisions to
grievance committees or disciplinary officers for both sanction and
compensation for attorney fees rather than the current discretionary
provisions? Yes
No

If no, why?
_
_

takes away judicial discretion (not all violations should be reported)
small problem, does not merit reporting
problem does not exist
deters meritorious filings
possible douile jeopardy
other, please explain
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If yes, why?

__

safe harbor weakens deterrence
reporting strengthens the rule
should be imposed for all violations
will improve the practice of attorneys
improves professional image
other, please explain

6. Once a violation has been reported, what procedure is used to process the
violation? Please briefly describe the procedure.

7. A bill is pending in Congress that will eliminate the safe harbor provision
of FRCP 11 and reimpose mandatory sanctions for violations. Do you prefer
the current discretionary or the proposed mandatory version?
Current FRCP 11 _

Proposed FRCP 11

8. Would you be in favor of a compromise change in the safe harbor
provision to fewer days, such as 7 or 14 days? Yes __
No
_

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 3

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss1/3

